The last term is positive because Ψ soep t+1 > 0, and µ soep t+1 > 0 given the collateral constraint will bind in the next period with a positive probability.
Consider a reallocation of resources by the representative SOE planner starting from the optimal allocations in the decentralized equilibrium. This implies holding one more unit of bonds yields identical marginal costs to the decentralized agents and the SOE planner, U de T,t = U soep T,t , but higher marginal benefits to the SOE planner because βE t R t+1 U de T,t+1 = βE t R t+1 U soep T,t+1 and the last term of (A.2) is positive. Therefore, the SOE planner values bond holdings more than the decentralized agents.
A.2 PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof. Plug in bond market clearing condition (4.5) into (4.3) to yield:
Rearrange terms to get an expression for the world interest rate:
Taking first derivative with respect to the periphery countries' bond holdings yields: 
We focus on the most empirically relevant parameter space: (1 + β * )b t+1 + β * y * 1 > 0 and (1 + β * )b t+1 − β * y * 1 < 0. This implies the incentive term b t+1 (∂R t+1 /∂b t+1 ) is decreasing in b t+1 . Given that (∂R t+1 /∂b t+1 ) < 0 from lemma 1, it is easy to see when the peripheral countries decide to save (b t+1 > 0), b t+1 (∂R t+1 /∂b t+1 ) is negative, so the incentive to manipulate the world interest rate is stronger as the saving amount is higher. In contrast, when the peripheral countries decide to borrow (b t+1 < 0), b t+1 (∂R t+1 /∂b t+1 ) is positive, so the desire to manage the world interest rate is stronger as the borrowing amount is higher.
A.4 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Proof. When the borrowing constraint is currently not binding, µ t = 0. The periphery coordinator's Euler equation (4.23) becomes:
Given that the Lagrangian multiplier λ t+1 = U T,t+1 + µ t+1 Ψ t+1 > 0, and ∂R t+1 /∂b t+1 < 0 from Lemma 1, it is obvious when peripheral countries are saving, i.e. b t+1 > 0, the last term of (A.8) is negative. On the other hand, when peripheral countries are borrowing, i.e. b t+1 < 0, the last term of (A.8) is positive. Next we compare the periphery coordinator's valuation of bond positions relative to the SOE planners and decentralized agents.
Periphery Coordinator vs. SOE planners:
Consider a reallocation of resources by the coordinator starting from the SOE planners' optimal allocations. This implies holding one more unit of bonds yields identical marginal costs to the SOE planners and the periphery coordinator, U soep T,t = U pc T,t , but different marginal benefits. Because at the initial allocations,
, so when the last term of (A.8) is positive (negative), the periphery coordinator values bond holdings more (less) than the SOE planners.
Periphery Coordinator vs. Decentralized agents:
Consider a reallocation of resources by the coordinator starting from the optimal allocations in the decentralized equilibrium. This implies holding one more unit of bonds yields identical marginal costs to the decentralized agents and the periphery coordinator, U de T,t = U pc T,t , but different marginal benefits. Because at the initial allocations, βE t R t+1 U de T,t+1 = βE t R t+1 U pc T,t+1 , comparing (A.1) to (A.8) to see that the marginal benefits differ by the sum of two terms:
. When the peripheral countries are saving b t+1 > 0, the last term is negative and the sum may be positive or negative depending on the relative strength of the two terms, hence the periphery coordinator may value additional bond holdings more or less relative to the decentralized agents. On the other hand, when the peripheral countries are borrowing b t+1 < 0, the sum of the two terms is always positive, so the periphery coordinator always values bond holdings more relative to the decentralized agents.
A.5 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Proof. We write the Euler equations under the three equilibria respectively below:
(A.11) By comparing the three Euler equations, it is straightforward to show that a tax on private agent's bond holdings:
restores the national regulator's equilibrium allocations, and a tax
where ∂R t+1 /∂b t+1 is given by (A.5), implements the periphery coordinator's allocations when the proceeds are redistributed to the private agents in a lump-sum fashion.
B SOLUTION METHODS
This section describes the global non-linear numerical methods that we use to solve the three equilibria in our paper. For all three equilibria, the state variables are the bond position for all the peripheral countries b, the current endowment realization y (consists of tradable endowment y T and nontradable endowment y N ), and current financial condition realization κ. We discretize the bond position space into a 900-point evenly-spaced grid. We use the method described by Tauchen (1986) to discretize the tradable and nontradable endowment processes. We allow 4 realizations for both tradable and nontradable endowments, so there is a total of 16 endowment realizations. The processes for the endowment and financial condition are discussed in section 5.1. B.1 DECENTRALIZED AGENTS' AND SOE PLANNER'S PROBLEM We use Euler equation iteration to solve for the decision rules of the decentralized agents' and the representative SOE planner's problem. The solution method involves iterating on the recursive Euler equation until it converges and it is described in Coleman (1991) and Baxter (1991) . It is then incorporated into models with occasionally binding constraints by Bianchi (2011) and we follow his algorithm closely to solve for the decentralized agents' and the representative SOE planner's problems. To solve the decentralized agents' problem, we need to solve for functions
where the world interest rate function R(b) is given by (4.4). The algorithm to solve the decentralized agents' problem follows:
1. Discretize the state space and generate a grid according to the method described above. We use linear interpolation to interpolate over the bond position grid.
Make an initial guess of
3. Set j = 0.
For a given j and function
3), (B.5) and a one-dimensional root finding algorithm.
(b) Use price function from the last step p j (b, y, κ), check if the collateral constraint (B.4) is satisfied. By using the last iteration's price function, we can avoid the problem of multiplicity in the root finding problem and it becomes innocuous when the price function converges. For robustness check, we start from different initial guesses and always get the same result. We also plot the collateral constraint after the code converges and find no multiplicity. (b, y, κ) and x ∈ {b , c T , c, p, µ}, then go back to step 3 with j = j + 1. Otherwise, the iteration converges and we have found the equilibrium.
To solve for the representative SOE planner's problem, we use the same algorithm above. However, instead of using decentralized agents' Euler equation (B.1), we use the representative SOE planner's Euler equation:
B.2 PERIPHERY COORDINATOR'S PROBLEM We use value function iteration to solve the periphery coordinator's problem. The periphery coordinator's problem can be written recursively as:
We use cubic splines to approximate the value function of the periphery coordinator V(b, y, κ) and solve the maximization problem using sequential quadratic programming algorithm (Kraft, 1994) from the NLopt package in Fortran developed by Johnson (2014) . We then apply the standard value function iteration method to solve for the decision rules of the periphery coordinator under each state (b, y, κ).
C CALIBRATION TO LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
As discussed in section 5.6.1, our alternative calibration includes data from 1970 to 2011 on five Latin American countries: Argentina, Colombia, Guatemala, Uruguay, and Venezuela. We follow the same calibration strategy as in the baseline calibration, except for β. We now set the discount factor of the periphery countries β to match the average real interest rate of the selected group of Lain American countries, which is different from the U.S. interest rate. Note that in our alternative calibration, our definition of the tradable sector for Latin American countries includes agriculture, mining, and manufacturing. The calibrated parameter values are listed in table C.1. The estimated bivariate autoregressive coefficients and the variancecovariance matrix for the endowment process are shown below: ρ = 0.4610 −0.0149 0.5719 0.3525 , Ω = 0.00979828 0.0115977 0.0115977 0.017627 . Table C .2 reports the simulated model moments and their data counterparts. Our model is able to produce more volatile consumption relative to output as observed in the data. The model also matches the standard deviation of the current account to GDP ratio and the correlation of consumption with GDP. The current account/GDP ratio is strongly countercyclical in the data, but our model predicts the ratio to be acyclical. The model implies an average per capita consumption drop of 9.5% during crises, which is comparable to the observed drop of 9.1% during the 2001 Latin American debt crisis.
D DECOMPOSITION OF SHOCKS
In our baseline model, the peripheral countries are subject to three shocks: the financial shock, the nontradable endowment shock, and the tradable endowment shock. In this section we investigate the role and the relative contribution of each shock to the model statistics. Table  D .1 shows the average NFA position, the probability of crisis, and the welfare gains when we shut down each shock in turn. Table D .1 shows that, in general, less uncertainty reduces the probability of crisis. As a result, the peripheral countries lower their average NFA position since their need for precautionary savings is weakened. Current Account/GDP Correlation with GDP -0.56 -0.01 a GDP and consumption data are from the UN National Accounts Main Aggregates Database. Current account balance data come from the IMF's WEO database. b The GDP, y, is in units of tradables and is calculated as the sum of tradable and nontradable output y = y T + py N . c We take the log of all the data and HP-filter it with the exception of the current account balance.
Of the three shocks, the tradable endowment shock contributes the most to generate the model statistics. When the peripheral countries' tradable endowment is fixed at its mean, the probability of crisis becomes much smaller. In addition, the precautionary saving motive is greatly weakened and the average NFA position plunges to 0.84% of the tradable GDP. Since there is only a negligible probability that the peripheral countries will experience a financial crisis, national regulation improves welfare only marginally at 3.17 × 10 −5 % of the permanent consumption. In this case, there is little room for the periphery coordinator to exert market power when borrowing and saving in the international financial market due to the low average NFA position. As a result, the welfare gain in the periphery countries and the welfare loss in the core country are significantly less than those in the baseline case.
Nontradable goods shock plays a qualitatively similar role to the tradable goods shock, but it is quantitatively less important. We can see from the third column that the probability of crisis and the average NFA are lower in all three equilibra. In addition, the welfare gain is lower than in the baseline case. Lastly, the financial shock is the least significant contributor to the model dynamics but affects the crisis probability substantially. However, even though the probability of crisis is lower when the financial shock is absent, the SOE planner can still yield a higher welfare gain relative to the baseline result. This is because the peripheral countries save less in the absence of financial shocks, and thus they have a higher rate of return from savings. In this section, we experiment with an alternative calibration to the Asian countries that generates a higher probability of crisis relative to our benchmark calibration. This calibration differs from the benchmark in two aspects. First, we detrend the tradable and nontradable endowment process with quadratic trends instead of the HP-filter in the benchmark case. As a result, the tradable and nontradable endowment processes become more volatile relative to those in the benchmark calibration. Second, we use the log utility instead of the CRRA utility function with a risk aversion parameter of γ = 2 as in the benchmark calibration. The low risk aversion reduces the precautionary savings that households in the peripheral countries accumulate when they are close to the collateral constraint binding region. Therefore, the households are constrained by collateral more frequently. We follow the same strategy to calibrate the remaining parameters as in the baseline case. The financial constraint tightness parameter κ h changes from 0.33 to 0.28 while parameter κ l changes from 0.15 to 0.10. Meanwhile, the other parameter values stay the same. Figure E .1 plots the ergodic distributions of the bond positions in the three equilibria. The qualitative property of the distribution is the same as the benchmark case. But it is more skewed to the right and has a higher weight in the binding region relative to the one under the benchmark calibration in figure 4 . From table E.1, we can see that this alternative calibration produces a crisis probability of 1.36%, which is significantly higher than that under our benchmark calibration, and an average welfare loss 1 from conducting the country-level macroprudential policy that is of similar magnitude relative to our benchmark result. Table E .2 reports the business cycle statistics of the data under the benchmark calibration, and under the alternative calibration. Overall, it performs worse than the benchmark in Peripheral Countries' Bond Position terms of matching the selected business cycle moments. For example, consumption becomes less volatile relative to output, which is inconsistent with the salient observation for EMEs (σ(c)/σ(y) = 0.88 in this calibration vs. 1.14 in the data). The ratio of the standard deviation of the current account to the standard deviation of the output becomes much smaller relative to the data counterpart. Moreover, the highest consumption drop during crises we can generate under this calibration is 4.1%, which is much milder than the observed drop of 6.3% during the 1997 Asian crisis. The GDP, y, is in units of tradables and calculated as the sum of tradable and nontradable output y = y T + py N . c We take the log of all the data and HP-filter it with the exception of the current account balance.
